

# **The Prague Agenda – The Way Forward**

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I'm very pleased to be back in Prague this April – for the third April in a row! Two years ago, I was here with President Obama when he made his now famous speech in Hradcany Square, in which he set out the 'Prague Agenda' – his vision for achieving the “peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” and proposed a plan of action for near term practical steps to move in that direction. Then, last April, we were back in Prague again for President Obama and President Medvedev to sign the New START Treaty in the Prague Castle. Now, this year, I would like to thank Minister Schwarzenberg and the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Institute of International Relations for organizing this international conference to take stock of the Prague Agenda and consider future actions.

President Obama's Prague Agenda has four inter-linked tracks:

**First:** to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons by those states that already possess nuclear weapons, starting with Russia and the U.S.

**Second:** to prevent additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons by strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and by holding

accountable those states that have violated their obligations, such as Iran and North Korea.

**Third:** to prevent nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear materials and strengthening international cooperation on nuclear security.

**Fourth:** and as your Ambassador-designate to the US stressed just last week, to develop new mechanisms to support the growth of safe, secure, renewable nuclear power in ways that reduce the spread of dangerous technologies.

In the two years since President Obama's Prague speech, we have made significant progress on all four tracks. The New START Treaty will result in the lowest level of deployed nuclear weapons since the 1950s. Under our revised nuclear doctrine, we have reduced the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy, while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary and defend the U.S. and our allies and partners.

Last spring's landmark nuclear security summit in Washington strengthened international cooperation against the threat of nuclear terrorism and pledged support for President Obama's goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. In the year since the Summit, thousands of kilograms of nuclear materials—enough for hundreds of nuclear weapons—have been removed, secured or eliminated around the world. Working with allies and partners, we defied the skeptics and held a successful Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference that adopted a forward looking action plan by consensus. After years of negotiations, the IAEA Board of Governors agreed to establish an IAEA fuel bank to promote the peaceful expansion of nuclear power without increasing the risk of proliferation. To address the threat of proliferation, the United States led

successful efforts at the Security Council to impose unprecedented sanctions on Iran and North Korea for failing to fulfill their international nuclear obligations.

On the subject of civil nuclear power, the United States – like the Czech Republic – is moving forward with this vital renewable energy source. We all of course must learn from the Fukushima disaster. But the reality is that we are both leaders in the production of safe, clean nuclear power. We must continue and deepen our leadership and our partnership on the critical issue of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Going forward, President Obama is determined to build on this progress in each of the four areas of his Prague agenda. To prevent proliferation, we'll work to ensure that the IAEA has the resources, technology, and authority it needs to conduct effective monitoring and inspections. We'll continue to increase pressure on Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. And we will continue to make it clear to North Korea that it will never find the security it seeks unless it fulfills its commitments to complete denuclearization.

To enhance nuclear security, we'll continue to work with partners to convert research reactors so they no longer use Highly Enriched Uranium, lock down vulnerable materials and strengthen security at nuclear facilities. The Czech Republic and your Nuclear Research Institute, REZ, (REJZ) have been and will continue to be important partners in these efforts. We'll pursue a new treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and we'll work to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and bring it into force. To promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, we need to turn the IAEA fuel bank concept into reality, and seek agreement within the Nuclear Suppliers Group on tougher criteria for the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.

I would like to focus on prospects for additional nuclear arms reductions between the U.S. and Russia. As the two largest nuclear powers – which still control over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons – the U.S. and Russia need to take the lead in further reductions to demonstrate their commitment to disarmaments and to create conditions for including other nuclear powers in future agreements. In addition, nuclear arms control between the U.S. and Russia strengthens the reset in relations between Washington and Moscow that is helping us to address the most urgent proliferation threats we face in Iran and North Korea. Finally, strategic stability, cooperation, and transparency between the U.S. and Russia are important elements in maintaining European security.

Even as we begin to implement the New START treaty, we are making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions. Under the President’s direction, the Department of Defense will review our strategic requirements and develop options for significant reductions in our current nuclear stockpile, which stands at approximately 5,000 warheads, including both deployed and reserve warheads. To develop these options for further reductions, we need to consider several factors, such as potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures that are required for effective deterrence.

Once it is complete, this review of our strategic requirements will help shape our negotiating approach to the next treaty with Russia. One idea that we are considering is a single overall limit on all nuclear warheads, including deployed and non-deployed strategic and tactical warheads. Given the differences in U.S. and Russian force structures, it will probably be necessary to allow each side some freedom to mix different forces under the overall ceiling.

Within that overall ceiling, we will work with our NATO allies to create the conditions to reduce the role and number of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, as

Russia takes reciprocal measures to reduce its nonstrategic forces and relocates its nonstrategic forces away from NATO's borders. During its Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, NATO will identify the alliance's requirements for nonstrategic nuclear forces using various assumptions about how Russian nonstrategic forces could be reduced. The United States can factor these requirements into its development of proposals for "next steps" in nuclear reductions between it and Russia. In advance of a new treaty limiting tactical nuclear weapons, we also plan to consult with our allies on reciprocal actions that could be taken on the basis of parallel steps by each side. As a first step, we would like to increase transparency on a reciprocal basis concerning the numbers, locations, and types of nonstrategic forces in Europe. We will consult with our European allies as we speak to Russia to develop this initiative.

Achieving the next round of strategic arms reductions will be an ambitious task that will take time to complete. No previous arms control agreement has tried to limit and monitor non-deployed warheads or tactical warheads. To do so will require more demanding approaches to verification. We plan to propose to Russia that we discuss transparency and confidence building measures that could provide the basis for creative verification measures in the next round of U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reductions.

In parallel with these discussions with Russia, the President is committed to developing an effective missile defense system to defend the U.S. and its allies against emerging missile threats from such countries as Iran and North Korea. The Phased Adaptive Approach approved by President Obama last year provides a more effective and a more timely response to the most likely missile threats that we will face in coming years. And, our allies accepted our new approach at the NATO Lisbon summit last November.

As the President has repeatedly said, our missile defense program does not threaten Russia's strategic deterrent. For this reason, President Obama and President Medvedev have agreed to develop a program of U.S.-Russia missile defense cooperation. We believe that such cooperation can provide assurances to Russia, that our missile defenses will not undercut strategic stability, while enhancing the ability of both nations to defend against emerging missile threats. For example, shared early warning data can increase the effectiveness of our missile defense system in Europe, while the U.S. and NATO retain the responsibility for defending themselves against ballistic missile threats.

Ambassador-designate Gandalovic (Gan-DAL-o-vitch) stressed at last week's panel with Madeleine Albright the Prague Agenda's fourth pillar: the importance of working together to expand the use of safe and secure nuclear power. And I fully agree. The United States is the world's largest supplier of commercial nuclear power, with 104 nuclear power plants spread across 31 states – more than any other country. Over half of all reactors world-wide are based on U.S. technology. The Czech Republic is also a leader in nuclear energy, with a strong nuclear industry, a cutting edge nuclear research facility and expert nuclear scientists, engineers and regulators, led by Dana Drabova (Danna DRA-bova). The U.S. and Czech nuclear power plants offer reliable and affordable baseload electricity, and they do so without air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.

We all of course must learn from the Fukushima disaster. There is no question about that, and both of our countries are embarked upon doing so. But the leaders of both of our countries have also reaffirmed our commitment to safe, secure and clean nuclear energy as an important part of our domestic and global energy mix. In December, the U.S. and Czech Republic signed a joint declaration on Cooperation in the Civil Nuclear Field. Our two nuclear regulatory agencies are

enhancing their already excellent cooperation. Next month experts from both of our countries will meet for the second time in four months to develop concrete ways we can increase bilateral cooperation on nuclear R&D to further improve existing reactors and to build the next generation of safe secure reactors for the future.

In conclusion, the Prague Agenda is alive and well. We all recognize that a world free of nuclear weapons will likely take many years to achieve – as President Obama said, it may not happen in his lifetime. Nonetheless, the Prague Agenda provides a pathway to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons, to prevent additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons, to deny terrorists access to fissile material, and to promote safe and secure peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Standing in Hradcany Square two springs ago, President Obama said that “Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be stopped, cannot be checked – that we are destined to live in a world where more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction.” But, he warned, “Such fatalism is a deadly adversary.” Two years on, we’re proud of the progress we’ve made in meeting this challenge, and we remain confident that with strong international cooperation we can live in a world where fewer nations – and ultimately none - possess the ultimate tools of destruction. We are also confident that the way ahead will pass through Prague and we look forward to future meetings here in Prague to assess progress and discuss next steps.